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Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) has changed the Awards and Incentives 
system in recent years in an effort to increase recruiter productivity and promote recruit 
quality goal achievement. The latest awards and incentive system updates have placed 
increased emphasis on recruit quality in support of Navy Recruiting Command’s strategic 
plan Recruit Force 2020. This thesis provides a detailed overview of the current Navy 
awards and incentives system. The thesis also attempts to estimate the effect of specific 
awards on the quality of recruit contracts. Furthermore, this thesis estimates the effect of 
monthly goaling targets on the quality of recruits. The objective is to determine if the 
current Navy awards and incentive system has an unintended consequence of reducing 
recruit quality. The analysis tests whether recruiters sacrifice quality as the end of the 
month approaches to meet their monthly goaling deadline. Also, the analysis tests the 
impact of Gold Wreath award on recruiter productivity and recruit quality. The results 
indicate that recruit quality tends to fall as the end-of-the-month approaches, specifically 
during the last week of the month. However, the results did not support the hypothesis 
that recruiters sacrifice quality to obtain their first Gold Wreath award. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will evaluate the U.S. Navy’s awards and incentives system and its 
effects on monthly recruit contract quality. The thesis will estimate the level of recruiter 
productivity, with respect to recruit quality, as determined by monthly goaling criteria. 
The objective is to determine if the current Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) awards 
and incentive system has unintended consequences of causing reductions in recruit 
quality. Specifically, recruiters may sacrifice on the quality of recruits as the end of the 
month approaches to meet their monthly goaling deadline. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question 1: Do recruiters have lower quality recruits at the end of the 
month compared to the beginning of the month? 
Research Question 2: Does recruit quality decrease during the three-month award 
eligibility window for a recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award, and reduce even more in the 
last month of that three-month award window? 
C. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) keen focus on the variation in recruiter 
productivity since the establishment of the All-Volunteer-Force (AVF) has driven a wide 
array of research analysis and studies on how to increase recruiter productivity while 
utilizing available resources effectively and efficiently. Over the last few decades, the 
population of high quality military-eligible youth has increased; however, during the 
same period, the propensity to serve has decreased amongst that population. The Navy 
recruiters’ job is increasingly challenged by the availability of alternative civilian labor 
market options and by educational options for the targeted population of eligible youth.  
Recruiter awards and incentives systems have been utilized through a wide array 
of programs to increase recruiter productivity throughout their recruiting tour that is 
usually three years in length. While previous programs, such as the Freeman Plan, and 
 2 
Recruiter Excellence Incentive Program (REIP), were considered successful to some 
extent by some analysts (Asch, 1990), such programs often displayed some unexpected 
negative effects on recruiter behavior towards the end of a production cycle, particularly 
an increased number of lower quality recruit contracts. For this area of study, recruit 
quality is determined by a mix of factors, such as Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) scores, and High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) status. 
The current Navy Recruiting Command Awards System gives recruiters the 
opportunity to earn awards and incentives on a quarterly and annual basis throughout the 
tour of recruiting duty. Recruiters are able to earn individual awards for productivity and 
for meeting or exceeding monthly goals. The recruiter has the opportunity for rewards 
that include, but are not limited to, immediate promotion under the Recruiter Command 
Advancement Program (RCAP), Navy Commendation medals, Navy Achievement 
medals, and time off during the production cycle for exceeding individual goals over a 
specified period as promulgated by the Navy Recruiting District (NRD) Commanding 
Officer’s (CO) monthly goaling letter. Most time-off incentives vary across NRD, which 
is set by each CO dependent upon the goals of the districts and geographical areas they 
cover. 
When goals are not met, recruiters are assessed and training is commonly 
recommended. NRD staff stated that no formal negative penalties have occurred for 
individual recruiters not making their goal. 
This thesis attempts to determine if recruiters sign lower quality recruits at the end 
of the month compared to the beginning of the month. Also, this thesis assesses whether 
the current Navy Recruiter Awards System incentivizes recruiters to sacrifice recruit 
quality to earn awards, specifically at the end of the three-month award eligibility 
window. Recommendations are made to assist CNRC in making informed decisions 
about the effective and efficient management of recruiting resources. 
D.  SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The scope of the thesis includes (1) a review of the Navy recruiting command 
awards and incentive system, (2) an in-depth review of the Navy recruiting command’s 
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goaling process to include fiscal year (FY)13 operational analysis and risk assessment, 
(3) a statistical analysis of monthly recruit contract quality for individual recruiters, and 
states, (4) an analysis of the effects of the awards system on monthly and quarterly recruit 
contract quality, and (5) a set of recommendations for an effective solution to further 
support NRC’s FY13 Business Plan and Recruiting Force 2020 Strategy (RF 2020) 
(Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 2012a). 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research is primarily quantitative and uses the following methodology. 
• Conduct a literature review analyzing previous work done in the area of 
recruiter productivity 
• Analyze Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment 
(PRIDE) Data (1997–2011) provided by CNRC. 
• Visit NRD San Francisco to discuss with staff how the goaling, award and 
incentive programs are administered. Obtain information about the 
tangible and intangible effects of awards/incentives on recruiter behavior 
with respect to increased or decreased productivity on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. Also, have continuing discussions with recruiters about 
actions concerning achievement and non-achievement of recruiter goals. 
• Engage CNRC and Region West staff in conversation with respect to the 
recruiter goaling process. 
• Develop several multivariate models to help predict recruiter productivity 
based on the quality of recruit contracts during specific periods at the end 
of a month. The models will use explanatory variables based on individual 
demographics, geographical area covered (state), FY97–11), and state 
unemployment rates. 
• Make recommendations on policies to increase recruiter productivity via 
the awards and incentives system. 
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 5 
II  CNRC AWARDS AND INCENTIVE SYSTEMS AND 
GOALING PROCESS 
A.  CNRC RECRUITER AWARD AND INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
The Navy enlisted recruiter awards and incentive system gives enlisted recruiters 
the ability to earn individual awards and incentives based upon their monthly, quarterly, 
and annual production with respect to achieving their net new contract objective (NCO) 
and reserve attainment goals. The net NCO is derived from the difference between the 
number of contracts written and the number of actual recruit accessions and nets out 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) attrition. The net NCOs and reserve attainment goals are 
disseminated from each Navy Recruiting Region to each NRD under their cognizance via 
a Monthly Goaling Letter. Recruiter award and incentive eligibility is based upon the 
beginning of the month goals. Mid-month goal adjustments do not adversely affect award 
and incentive eligibility; however, incentives may become more robust to help shape 
recruiter behavior to meet the changing mission. Monthly goals are set for each recruiter 
according to the NRD and Navy Recruiting Station (NRS) at which the recruiter is 
assigned. 
A recruiter may earn a variety of awards for team and individual efforts. 
Individual productivity awards include the Gold Wreath award and the Six-Shooter 
award. The Admiral’s Accelerator award utilizes the Recruiter Incentive System (RIS), 
which is a system that assigns points to recruits based on quality. Points are also assigned 
for the achievement of varying diversity goals (Black, female), special programs (Nukes, 
Special Warfare, Special Operations, Reserve, Active), and Total Test Category Upper 
(TTCU) (upper Mental Groups) (Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 2012a; 
Commander Navy Recruiting Command, n.d.).  
As stated in the Navy Recruiting Command’s “Recruiting Force 2020 Strategy” 
(Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 2012b), the mission of Navy recruiting is to 
“Recruit the best men and women for America’s Navy to accomplish today’s missions 
and meet tomorrow’s challenges.” 
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RF2020 places increased emphasis on three overarching goals. 
• Increase organizational productivity and capacity to meet all missions 
• Develop a very high quality workforce grounded in commitment and 
workplace satisfaction 
• Measure success and return on investment (ROI) to balance against future 
recruiting risk 
B.  HISTORY OF CNRC AWARDS AND INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
CNRC has changed the awards and incentives system throughout the last few 
decades in an effort to increase recruiter productivity and promote recruit quality goal 
achievement. The latest awards and incentive system updates have placed a large 
emphasis on recruit quality in support of Navy Recruiting Command’s RF 2020. A few 
of the challenges that recruiters face in achieving their goals are increased standards for 
military qualifications, shifting population demographics, recruiting diversity, and the 
focus on “fit vs. fill.” The focus on “fit vs. fill” describes the shift to quality versus 
quantity in Navy recruitment.  
A recruiter may earn only one of many awards for the same achievement, act, or 
period of meritorious service. The current system, as well as the previous one, allows 
recruiters to earn team and individual awards. This thesis focuses primarily on the 
attainment of individual awards by recruiters. In February 2012, the awards and 
incentives system was changed to base eligibility criteria on TTCU1 quality contract 
attainment specifications (Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 2012a). This change 
signals a shift of focus to recruit quality versus recruit quantity in the recruiting world.  
Under the current system, a Gold Wreath award is earned based on the net NCO 
and Reserve attainment goals disseminated in the NAVCRUITDIST’s Monthly Goaling 
Letter. A recruiter may earn an unlimited number of Gold Wreath awards during their 
recruiting tour. The eligibility criteria for the Gold Wreath award states that enlisted 
programs recruiters are eligible for a Gold Wreath when they achieve any combination of 
four net new contracts/reserve gains (affiliations and/or enlistments) within a consecutive 
                                                 
1 Test Category Upper (TCU) now called Total Test Category Upper (TTCU) = (AFQT=>50); (TSC1-
3). 
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(non-overlapping) three month period or less, or three net TTCU new contracts in a three-
month, non-overlapping period (Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 2012a). The 
time period covered for any given Gold Wreath award cannot be used for any subsequent 
awards. No numerical requirement exists for recruit contracts achieved per month during 
any month in the three-month eligibility period as long as the overall quantity is attained.  
The Admiral’s Accelerator Award (AAA) is a quarterly program created to 
provide incentives for specific production requirements in areas, such as Recruiter Active 
Component (AC) or Reserve Component (RC), nuclear, and diversity to name a few. 
Military performance and conduct are also taken into consideration when COs determine 
candidate awardees. Under the AAA program, a RIS,2 a point-based system, assigns 
points based on recruit quality type that may change from quarter-to-quarter depending 
on the recruit quality needs of the Navy. The top recruiter of each Navy Recruiting 
District (NAVCRUITDIST) who contracts the highest (net) number of TTCU contracts is 
eligible for the AC or RC version of AAA. Additionally, any recruiter who contracts a 
Prior Service Reserve or a Musician (MU) will be awarded two additional RIS points. 
Eligibility for the Nuke AAA requires top recruiters have the highest number of Nuke 
Female Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate (NUPOC) applicants (Surface Warfare 
Officer (SWO), Sub, Instructor or Engineer) sent to interview during the award period. 
Two of these awards are presented nationally, one for each of the two Navy Recruiting 
Regions (NAVCRUITREG). The Diversity AAA is awarded to recruiters who attain the 
highest total number of high quality African American and Hispanic applications ordered 
to the Professional Review Board (ORDPRO) during the award period. Four awards are 
presented nationally, two per NAVCRUITREG. 
The RIS is the only point-based system authorized for use by the NRC. A 
description of the point system is presented in Appendix. For individual recruiters, RIS 
points are based primarily on the quality of the enlisted applicant during initial entry into 
DEP (affiliation), or for officers, the Officer Package submission and selection. Points are 
given for new contracts (NCO and Prior Service), TTCU, Special Operations (Spec-ops), 
                                                 
2 RIS formerly known as Enlisted Recruiter Incentive System (ERIS). 
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and Nuke to name a few. Additional RIS points are also received for accessions. 
Recruiter incentive points are promulgated quarterly on the AAA’s notice dependent 
upon the needs of the Navy. The points are distributed as rate-specific to achieve “FIT” 
for the Navy. 
Another award available for recruiters is the Commander Navy Reserve Force 
(CNRF) award. The CNRF award is presented to the top recruiter, whether AC or RC, in 
each NAVCRUITDIST who writes the highest number of net New Accession Training 
(NAT) contracts during the annual award period issued at the end of the FY. The NAT 
program was created for non-prior-service recruits to access into the Navy Reserve 
Selected Reserve (SELRES) primarily to supplement manning in an effort to reduce 
critical ratings shortfalls. NAT recruits would initially attend Recruit Training Command 
and continue to an A-school (rate-specific) and a C-school (rate-specific specialization 
training) if necessary prior to returning to their hometown. After successful completion of 
all required schooling and training, NAT recruits are then under the cognizance of the 
Navy Operational Support Center nearest their residence (Navy Recruiting Manual-
Enlisted 1130.8J Vol. 4). 
Enlisted mission recruiters who achieve a monthly net Production Per Recruiter 
(PPR) of 2.0 or greater for the FY are eligible to receive a Navy and Marine Corps 
Achievement Medal (NAM). Also, enlisted mission recruiters who achieve a net PPR of 
4.0 or greater for the FY are eligible to receive a Navy Commendation (NC) medal. Each 
fiscal year, personnel will only receive the highest production medal (NC or NAM) 
earned with the exception of the CO’s special achievement NAMs for production. The 
CO’s special achievement NAMs for production include critical programs awards, such 
as the CNRF Award, and the Commander Navy Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) 
Award, which are not all inclusive. Time off from duty is also authorized for various 
levels of production, and is used to shape recruiter behavior with respect to monthly, 
quarterly, and annual recruit quality attainment goals. 
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The Six-Shooter Award, although not currently available to recruiters in the 2012 
awards manual, was earned by an individual recruiter personally achieving six net new 
contracts during any given month. Recruiters who earned this award were given time off 
(Special Liberty), a six-shooter plaque, and recognition in the Navy Recruiting Command 
Magazine.  
Commander Navy Recruiting Command authorized the Admiral’s Five Star 
Award beginning on January 2006. Recruiters earned this award by personally achieving 
five net new contracts during any given month. After three consecutive months of earning 
the award, recruiters become eligible for a Flag Letter of Commendation (LOC) that 
translated into two points toward advancement exams for E-6 and below.  
C.  ANNUAL AWARDS 
The national AC and RC enlisted recruiters of the year, national enlisted diversity 
recruiter of the year,3 and National NSW/NSO recruiter of the year is eligible for a 
NAVCRUITCOM NC. Strong consideration is given to recruiters whose efforts directly 
contribute toward achievement of the NRC’s priority, diversity, and quality targets. 
Prior to February 2012, to earn the Gold Wreath award, a recruiter was not 
required to achieve every monthly quality goal within the three-month award eligibility 
period as long as the recruiter obtained the required number of contracts within the three-
month award window. Also, the right quality contract was desired but not required to win 
the award. Over time, the number of contracts required to earn an award has decreased 
due to the downsizing and right-shaping of the U.S. Navy. District or station leadership 
may prevent recruiters from writing, for example, five contracts in the third month just to 
receive an award if recruiters are not meeting their monthly goals during the first two 
months of that award eligibility period. The responsibility for monitoring and requiring 
that the recruiters write high quality contracts is held more importantly at the district and 
individual station leadership level. One of the main challenges faced by the leadership is 
ensuring that recruiters are focused on achieving high quality contracts instead of just 
                                                 
3 For purposes of Recruiter of the Year (ROY) consideration, “Diversity” includes African-American, 
Hispanic, Native American, Asian Pacific Islander, and female. 
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chasing the awards and incentives that can be achieved by writing low-quality contracts. 
The recruiting challenge increases in high-volume, low-quality markets when trying to 
meet monthly mission goals. The reality in the recruiting world is that more work is 
required when recruiting lower quality recruits due to their increased DEP attrition risk, 
probable academic shortcomings, and increased supervision requirements (Bruno, 2005). 
The increased workload is evident during mid-month recruit goal shifts when increases 
may occur in individual recruiters’ contract goals. 
Another highly sought after incentive is the RCAP promotion, which replaced the 
Recruiter Excellence Incentive Program (REIP) promotion in August 2007. The change 
was propelled by the large difference in advancement opportunities afforded to active 
recruiters opposed to reserve recruiters (primarily canvasser recruiters (CANRECs)). 
Under RCAP (COMNAVCRUITCOM INSTRUCTION 1430.7C), eligibility 
requirements to earn the promotion were simplified and the inequities between active and 
reserve Full Time Support (FTS) recruiters were mostly eliminated. The RCAP program 
is utilized to achieve production benchmarks, which include the Navy’s accession and 
Test Category Upper (TCU) quality goals (now called Total Test Category Upper 
(TTCU)). Also, RCAP provides increased meritorious promotion opportunities using a 
“total person” concept to incentivize production in excess of 100% of recruiting goals.  
Two types of RCAP awards may be earned, meritorious and production. The 
number of RCAP awards available to each NRD is calculated using the following 
formula. 
• Meritorious RCAP Allowances: Meritorious advancement authorizations 
are based on the average annual active enlisted manning of each NRD. 
These advancements are equal to one per 50 enlisted personnel or fraction 
thereof. For example: 
 # of Meritorious RCAP = Average (AC) Enlisted Manning  
 Advancements allowed 50  
• Production RCAP Allowances. Additional RCAP authorizations can be 
earned by NRDs based on the following achievements. 
(1)  NRD’s achieving 100% NSW/NSO4 NCO: 1% x [NRD average 
annual enlisted manning] = additional RCAP Advancements. 
                                                 
4 Navy Special Warfare/ Navy Special Operations (NSW/NSO) recruit career options. 
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(2)  NRDs that achieve two of the four following production criteria: 
1% x [NRD average annual enlisted manning] = additional RCAP 
Advancements.  
• Production criteria: 
 
• 100% Fiscal year (AC) Test Category Upper (TCU)5 
• 100% Fiscal year (RC) Test Category Upper (TCU) 
• 100% Fiscal year (AC) Accession 
• 100% Fiscal year (RC) Accession 
For each calculated RCAP allowance/authorization, a fractional result is always 
rounded up to the next number. In any case, the total overall percentage of RCAP awards 
may not exceed 5% of the NRD’s average annual enlisted manning. 
According to OPNAVINST 1430.4, CNRC is only allowed to submit 26 RC 
candidates per RCAP cycle. An equitable distribution of the 26 RC allowances is handed 
down from CNRC to the Navy regions. Career Recruiting Force recruiters (AC and RC) 
are ineligible for the award. Individual recruiters compete for the RCAP awards based on 
the program eligibility criteria and supervisor evaluations. To become eligible, a recruiter 
must be Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) qualified and have passed the recruiter 
board. All time-in-rate advancements requirements must also be met. Any person 
previously advanced under RCAP (or the previous REIP program) are ineligible for the 
advancement program. Recruiters must meet current health and physical readiness 
standards as set forth in the Navy’s OPNAVINST 6110.1. Another condition is that 
recruiters must have passed the last advancement exam given in the FY in which they are 
nominated for advancement. With all Navy advancements, evaluation reports are 
considered. As shown above, the total person concept is in effect in determining which 
recruiter becomes eligible to earn immediate promotion under RCAP.  
CNRC Awards Division and the NRD’s only maintain recruiter-earned awards in 
a database for two years. The Navy Department Awards Web Service (NDAWS) 
database manager stated that community-specific awards (i.e., “Gold Wreath Recruiting 
awards) are not input into NDAWS. Community-specific awards are those awards earned 
                                                 
5 Test Category Upper (TCU) now called Total Test Category Upper (TTCU) = (AFQT=>50). 
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while serving in specific warfare or special duty assignments, such as recruiting. The 
awards are input into the service members’ electronic service record (ESR) via scanned 
page 13 entry. Determining if the award was given specifically for production versus 
overall performance is definitely a challenge. The community-specific awards are 
processed by the individual NRDs and sent to the respective Personnel Support 
Departments (PSDs) to be entered into the service member’s ESR. Also, NRDs only have 
access to ESRs for members who are currently at their command. Collecting recruiting 
community-specific award data for this thesis posed a challenge due to the many man-
hours and manpower required to determine which recruiter earned what award from 1997 
through 2011.  
D.  CNRC GOALING PROCESS 
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) distributes the CNP goaling letter (trimester 
goals) to CNRC based upon the Quarterly Demand Plan (QDP). CNRC determines 
overall annual and monthly recruiting goals then sent to Region East and Region West to 
be appropriately apportioned out to each NRD under their cognizance. The Navy’s 
goaling model is run once a year at CNRC to provide goal shares for each NRD 
aggregated out to each region for new contract shipping goals by month, rate, program, 
and gender. The goal distribution determination is based upon population demographics 
for the areas of responsibility for each region. Another factor considered is the historical 
success in recruiting and the state unemployment rates. The local unemployment rate is a 
huge driving factor, particularly long term, in the Navy recruiter’s ability to recruit and 
meet their mission successfully. The role of local unemployment rates are discussed more 
in Chapter IV.  
Currently, 26 NRDs are in existence. Thirteen are assigned to each region, 
respectively. Each NRD is comprised of nine divisions (formerly called zones) consisting 
of approximately four to five recruiting stations each. Currently, the recruiting stations 
number 1,418; however, this number may be reduced in the near future (CNRC staff 
provided current number of recruiting stations).  
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After receipt of the NRD goals, each NRD’s CO distributes a monthly goaling 
letter that delineates the recruiting prospect priorities, an up-to-date status on district 
production, and CO monthly incentives. A few of the categories commonly mentioned on 
a goaling letter for recruiting priorities are AC, NCO, RC, prior service, New Accession 
Training (NAT), nuke, and female goals. New Contract Objectives (NCO) are the recruits 
who have no prior service. NAT are those active (drilling) reservists personnel who go 
through recruit training, attend a service school for their rate, and are then sent back to 
their drilling home state for reserve duty.  
The Recruiting Operations Officer (R-OPS) begins the goaling distribution 
process at the NRD level. Then, the NRD’s Chief Recruiter and Assistant Chief Recruiter 
creates station, and thus, individual recruiter goals based upon the market share of youth 
population. The goals are developed using recruiter electronic databases, such as 
WebSTEAM, and ASAD, for up-to-date information. WebSTEAM is a database utilized 
in the recruiting community to provide the following reports: Goal Matrix (goal and sub 
goals by station); Leads Zip Code Report; and Market Share (zip code level and 
production demographics). WebSTEAM enables recruiters to perform their jobs more 
efficiently (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8J—Volume I–CH1). The quality and 
count of personnel in the DEP attribute to shaping the targeted goals. 
The Navy uses a “Fit to Fill” ideology for recruit position seeking. The more 
desirable recruits are those who score 50 or above on their AFQT test and are also 
HSDG. Currently, CNRC requires a combined quality goal of 75% recruits who are 
HSDGs and who have AFQT scores of 50 or greater. Applicants who score less than 50 
but 35 or above on their AFQT are qualified but not eligible unless a call for “open 
season” occurs, which is utilized to accommodate the needs of the Navy. These ineligible 
recruits are “banked,” and held in suspense until “open season.” The “open season” call 
by CNRC is dependent upon the Navy’s end strength profile and what is needed to make 
capacity given resource constraints. The “open season” call, if given, normally coincides 
with a 75% mission gate, which is normally the end of the third week of the month. In 
recruiting, mission gates refer to the time of the month that particular missions (goals) 
need to be met, such as the 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% gates. These percentages are 
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associated with monthly dates, for example the end of the first, second, third, and fourth 
weeks of the month, respectively. The exact dates may shift around the times of the 
month during which overall recruiter productivity is affected by operational or 
administrative commitments (i.e., federal holidays). 
Throughout any given month or year, a possibility exists that the recruit quality 
requirement may be reduced to account for an increase in the required overall number of 
individual contracts. The monthly mission is always dependent upon the Navy’s demand 
signal from CNRC and CNP with respect to recruit quality requirements. Month-to-
month mission changes may occur that disrupt a recruiter’s ability to recruit the right 
quality person required by mission. Recruiters are always challenged to attract the right 
people for the right job at the right time.  
E.  SUMMARY 
CNRC utilizes a combination of various awards and incentives to motivate 
recruiter performance. The most notable individual recruiter awards authorized are the 
Gold Wreath Award, AAA, Navy achievement medals, LOC medals, Recruiter 
Command Advancement Program immediate advancement, and time off from duty. Time 
off from duty is authorized in conjunction with earning particular awards. However, time 
off is also available monthly dependent upon each NRD’s criteria for eligibility as 
described in the CO’s monthly goaling letters.  
The monthly goals switch from month to month and may sometimes switch 
during the month based upon demand signals from CNRC and CNP. Also, in the 
recruiting community, the term “mission gates” is utilized. The mission gates are specific 
times (dates) during the month when  specific goals are required to be met, such as 
required quality and quantity of certain contracts (i.e., male upper or female air). “Male 
upper” refers to males who score 50 and above on the AFQT test. A mission gate may 
require that by the 20th of the month, 100% of male upper contracts must be written. 
After the mission gate, leadership may declare an “open season” period during which the 
recruiters are allowed to write the lower contracts that they may have been “banking.” 
The term “banking” refers to when a recruiter is not allowed to write a contract on willing 
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military-eligible applicants for one reason or another at the point of contact; however, 
these eligible recruits are told that they will be called upon at the next window of 
opportunity that the military is taking that type of recruit. An example of when a recruiter 
would bank an eligible recruit occurs when that person is a male lower (below 50 AFQT 
score) and the military has sufficient male lower inventory and requires only male uppers. 
That recruit is banked until the next window of opportunity for the recruiter to enlist male 
lower candidates.  
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  USMC END-OF-MONTH RECRUIT QUALITY STUDIES 
In the recruiting world, recruiters are under extreme pressure to meet monthly 
recruiting goals, particularly towards the end of a given month. If they have not obtained 
a high quality recruit, during any given month, recruiters may enlist lower quality recruits 
at the end of the month to meet the monthly goals established for their area of 
responsibility. The theses completed by Baczkowski (2006) and Bruno (2005) analyze 
and attempt to explain the effects of end of the month recruiting on the quality of new 
recruits as measured by DEP attrition and attrition at the Marine Corps Recruiting Depot 
(MCRD). Both studies control for observable factors that also affect attrition rates, such 
as age, gender, race, AFQT scores, and education.  
1.  Baczkowski (2006) 
In this Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Baczkowski seeks to determine if any 
statistical evidence exists that Marine Corps recruits recruited at the end of any given 
month have higher attrition rates compared to those recruited earlier in the month.  
Baczkowski hypothesizes that attrition may be higher for those recruits enlisted at 
the end of any given month, on average. Recruit DEP attrition and recruit training 
attrition was analyzed to determine if a statistical relationship occurs between recruits 
who sign contracts at the end of the month and their quality and attrition behavior. 
Baczkowski analyzes recruit attrition and quality based on whether they sign contracts 
during the last 10 days, the last week, and the last day of the month, respectively. 
Baczkowski uses multivariate Logit regression models to regress attrition on 
demographic variables, such as age groups (<19, <22, <28, <36), gender, race (White, 
Black, Other, Declined), education level (Senior and HSDG), AFQT score (Mental 
Group=Test Score Category (TSC)), Component (AC and RC), and dummy variables 
representing the day of the month a recruit enlisted (last 10 days, last five days, and last 
day, respectively). The estimated coefficients of the independent variables were analyzed  
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for partial effects and the odds ratios. Three separate models were estimated with the only 
difference between the different models being that each contained only one indicator 
variable for the time of the month that a recruit signed a contract. 
Baczkowski found no statistical evidence to support any significant relationship 
between MCRD basic training attrition and the day of the month a recruit enlists. For the 
other explanatory variables, he found that female recruits had an attrition rate at MCRD 
5.5 percentage points above that of male recruits. Black recruits were found to attrite at a 
rate of .01 percentage points greater than whites and other races. Also, he found that 
AFQT score is an accurate predictor of basic training success, where each one point 
increase in AFQT score increased the likelihood of success by 3.5 percentage points. 
2.  Bruno (2005) 
Another Marine Corps Naval Postgraduate School thesis, which was completed 
by Bruno, analyzed Marine Corp Recruit DEP attrition rates. Bruno analyzed a multitude 
of variables to determine their effect on DEP attrition rates of Marine recruits. Bruno 
makes the connection of the end of the month deadline to meet the required monthly 
goals with the term “hockey stick effect,” which was a phrase coined by Lee (1997). The 
hockey stick effect occurs when a rush occurs to meet a “deadline-sensitive goal (Bruno, 
2005).”  
Bruno uses a probit model to analyze the effect of many factors on a Marine 
Corps recruit’s probability of attrition while in the DEP. Bruno analyzes the day of the 
month a recruit enlists for its effect on DEP attrition. The factors used to explain attrition 
included HSDG status and High School Senior status. Next, Bruno’s attrition model did 
not include variables for gender or race.  
The explanatory variables included the time between when an individual took the 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test and when he actually 
enlisted (ASVABTIME), age, component (regular or reserve), AFQT score, and variables 
representing the first three weeks, as well as the last week, of the month (WEEK_123, 
WEEK_45) (Bruno, 2005). Bruno first tested each variable for its individual effect on 
DEP attrition rates and then included many interaction effects in an effort to determine 
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which combination of variable (factors) contributed to attrition risk. Next, he created 
groups of recruits with similar risk factors particularly for the timeframes during the first 
three weeks of the month compared to the last week of the month. Bruno used data for 
FY00/01 and FY03/04 data sets.  
The grouping process enabled the author to conclude initially that each group did 
not exhibit a higher DEP discharge (attrition) probability when recruited during the last 
week of the month as compared to the first week of the month. Furthermore, Bruno 
created three categories using the information he attained from the grouping process: (1) 
enlistees who exhibited a low probability of discharge at all times, (2) enlistees who 
exhibited a high probability of discharge regardless of when they were enlisted, and (3) 
enlistees who exhibited a high probability of discharge only during the last week of the 
month (Bruno, 2005).  
Bruno’s analysis found that all the variables utilized in the regression models 
were statistically significant using the FY00/01 data (Bruno, 2006). He found that the 
average individual who enlisted during the first three weeks of the month exhibited a 
17.3% probability of DEP attrition. A fourth week enlistee in that same model exhibited a 
19.5% attrition probability, which is 2.2 percentage points higher than other enlistees. 
Most importantly, the individual who enlists during the last week of the month has a 
21.3% probability of attrition, which is a 4.0-percentage point difference compared to 
those who enlisted during the first three weeks of the month. The results of the FY03/04 
model analysis supported the findings of the FY00/01 model results. The results of the 
FY03/04 model showed that individuals enlisting during weeks one through three have a 
19.2% attrition probability whereas those enlisting during the last week of the month 
have a 21.6% probability of discharge (2.4 percentage points higher). Most notable is that 
a recruit who enlists on the last day of the month has a 22.6% probability of attrition, 
which is 3.4 percentage points greater than a recruit who enlists during the first three 
weeks of the month.  
The results of Bruno’s analysis supported the theorized “end of the month rush” 
also known as the “Hockey stick effect” when individuals enlisting during the last week 
of the month have a greater likelihood of DEP attrition compared to those enlisting 
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during the first three weeks of the month. However, he noted that if enlistment criteria 
could identify high-risk recruits, attrition rates could be reduced before contracts are 
signed (Bruno, 2005). 
B.  USN ENLISTED RECRUITER GOAL SHARE AND GOAL-BASED 
RECRUITING STUDIES 
Hojnowski’s (2005) Naval Postgraduate School thesis research explored the 
enlisted goal-shares process distributed by CNRC to the Navy regional recruiting 
commands. Hojnowski analyzed the factors included in the U.S. Navy’s (USN) goaling 
model to determine their contribution towards the creation of goal-shares. Hojnowski 
found that CNRC’s goaling forecasts were accurate in predicting actual numbers of new 
contracts obtained during past time periods, but that improvement was possible by adding 
new variables in the goaling model (Hojnowski, 2005).  
In 1996, David Pry conducted thesis research to determine the validity of the 
allegations that the U.S. military services were inefficient and ineffective in the use of 
resources as stated in a prior Center for Navy Analysis (CNA) report. Pry’s research 
sought to examine the goal-based recruiting process and its effect on the use of resources. 
Another goal of Pry’s thesis was to attempt the explanation of the reduced (PPR and 
reduced mission accomplishment of the NRDs during the early 1990’s.  
CNRC requested that the CNA conduct a study on the effectiveness of recruiting 
models currently utilized to determine U.S. Navy enlisted and officer recruiting goals, 
and NRD goal shares. The goaling models do not consider the vast geographical coverage 
of each NRD; therefore, room for improvement is possible to determine more precise 
geographical allocation of recruiting resources, such as advertising and manpower 
(Pinelis, Schmitz, Miller, Rebhan, & Schmitz, 2011).  
1.  Hojnowski (2005) 
Hojnowski conducted interviews with key personnel in Navy recruiting who are 
knowledgeable and integral in the goaling process. Region West personnel were 
primarily called upon to discuss the goaling model and goal-share process. Most notable 
about this process is that CNRC distributes the goals to each region, East and West, who 
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then distribute the goal share to each NRD under their cognizance. The Navy Recruiting 
Districts Commanding Officers are under their own autonomy to ensure that the goals are 
distributed equitably to the enlisted recruiters in their NRD. NCO and accession goals are 
both assigned during this process.  
Hojnowski also sought to evaluate the factors that affect the supply of enlisted 
personnel to the Navy. The controllable factors, although not all inclusive, affecting the 
Navy’s ability to meet its recruit mission are DEP size, advertising, the number of 
available jobs for female recruits, desired quality mix, and bonuses. On the other hand, 
the population of eligible recruits, college entrance rates, and the veteran population are 
all uncontrollable factors that also affect the Navy’s ability to achieve its recruit goals 
successfully. The focus on the right (desired) quality mix is prominent when HSDG and 
AFQT scores equal to and greater than 50 (AFQT ≥50) are considered high quality 
(Hojnowski, 2005). 
The focus on enlisted recruiting, goal-share determination, and the factors 
impacting the Navy’s ability to achieve its mission is analyzed for process accuracy and 
validity. Due to the consistent annual replacement of approximately 10% of the Navy’s 
personnel end strength, the dynamic quality versus quantity determination is of great 
importance to the Navy. 
The enlisted goaling and forecasting model in use only predicts the supply of net 
new male contract objectives for those who have no prior military service, who have 
attained a score of 50 or greater on the AFQT and achieved a high school diploma. The 
aforementioned group falls into the A-cell recruit group who are highly desirable and 
harder to attract than other eligible recruits. A-cell recruits statistically and historically 
exhibit lower first-term attrition, higher program qualification rates, lower training costs, 
and the best performance in their jobs. B-Cell recruits are the personnel who do not 
possess a traditional high school diploma, but have scored at or greater than 50 on their 
AFQT. These recruits have the aptitude required for service qualification; however, the 
lack of a high school diploma has statistically and historically been linked to a lack of 
commitment needed for service and the highest first-term attrition amongst all recruits.  
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The Cu-Cell recruits are those who are HSDCs yet only score between 35 and 49 on their 
AFQT. These recruits have lower attrition rates than the B-Cell recruits, but slightly 
higher attrition rates compared to A-cell recruits. 
The goaling model is a tool used to determine recruiting district goals that 
consider past recruiting performance and the many factors that affect the ability to 
achieve the recruiting mission. For the goaling model, the dependent variable, as 
previously mentioned, was net new contracts of high quality males. The independent 
(explanatory) variables utilized were number of NRD production recruiters, eligible high 
quality (A-cell) male youth population, advertising dollars, enlistment bonuses, 
unemployment rates, military to civilian pay elasticity, eligible male HSDG TSC-IIIB 
(Cu-cell) population, veteran population, DEP size, retention, DoD recruiters, historical 
NCOs, and the quarterly seasonal (grouped months) effect. A fixed-effects autoregressive 
estimator is utilized for estimating the model that takes into account constant unknown 
differing variables across the recruiting districts, such as propensity to serve and 
patriotism. The primary explanatory variables of focus were eligible male high quality 
and low quality populations, number of recruiters, the unemployment rate, and relative 
earnings (military/civilian wage ratio). 
Hojnowski sought to determine if the econometric goaling model in use by the 
Navy was valid or if room for improvement was possible. Also, this research evaluated 
whether the goaling model was a good predictor of the supply of higher quality A-Cell 
recruits. Last, but not least, his research compared the workforce recruit supply models 
with that of the high school senior supply models (Hojnowski, 2005). 
Hojnowski found that even though the PPR has decreased over the years, the 
required number of contract and accession goals also has decreased (Hojnowski, 2005). 
While coupling the above scenario with the decrease in the eligible youth population’s 
propensity to serve, recruiters must work even harder to attract those desired eligible 
personnel.  
The ERIS, which is a point-based system, allowed recruiters to earn points based 
upon production. Under the old ERIS program, recruiter accumulated these points over 
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an annual production cycle. Due to the 36-month tour length of recruiters who normally 
check-in to their districts and station anytime during the year, the ability to compete for 
three cycles of awards was not feasible. A recruiter may at best compete for two cycles. 
Also noted was the ERIS programs’ possible built-in mechanism to reduce recruiters’ 
incentives to perform at a high level over the entire course of a production cycle. That 
behavior was thought to be attributed to either “stockpiling” recruits for the next cycle or 
working very little during the beginning or end of the production cycle to achieve the 
required contract goal. The ERIS program creates a contract-focused recruiter instead of 
one who focuses on both contracts and accessions, which contribute equally towards the 
Navy’s overall mission. Nevertheless, ERIS and other award programs have been 
creatively utilized in an effort to shape recruiter behavior during recruiting tours.  
Hojnowski’s research found that demographic and economic factors and 
recruiting resources drive the supply of new contracts for the Navy (Hojnowski, 2005). 
The Navy recruiter’s estimate results from the regression of the goaling model concludes 
that a Navy recruiter’s effect on the predictive accuracy for net new contracts from the 
high quality male population is far more statistically significant as compared to other 
DoD recruiters. Also, demographics play a large role in the recruit goaling model. 
Relative military to civilian pay and unemployment rates also exhibited notably high 
statistical significance in the model. The goaling model was found to be a relatively 
accurate predictor of net new contracts of high quality contracts (Hojnowski, 2005). 
Although the model was found to be accurate, areas of possible improvement 
were emphasized. The advertising variable, although of minimal statistical significance, 
would add increased value to the model if regional advertising expenditures could be 
included. The relative military to civilian pay variable also left room for improvement 
due to measurement error. The military pay, numerator, calculation is based on the 
average pay of E-1’s and E-2’s during the first two years of military service. The flaw 
introduced is the assumption that most recruits enter the service as E-1’s and E-2’s when 
actually, a large number of recruits enter the service as E-2’s and E-3’s. The variable 
calculation could be improved by utilizing E-1’s through E-3’s in the military pay 
calculation. Also, civilian pay is based on an average pay for 18–25 year-old whereas the 
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targeted population for initial service entry is 17–21 year olds. The discrepancy in the 
civilian wage for the targeted age group inflates the actual civilian pay alternative for the 
targeted eligible recruits.  
CNRC calculates the estimated number of high quality male recruits needed to 
meet established requirements from the FY enlisted recruiting goals and policies, which 
ultimately provide national accession requirements and quality mix for CNRC. Goal 
share percentages are also generated for quite a few other categories of accessions and 
NCO. Nevertheless, goal share percentages for Females, African-Americans, Hispanics, 
Asian-Pacific Islanders (API), and prior service accessions also must be derived. This 
process relies heavily on historical demographic regional production data including 
projected recruiting resources. The assignment of targets for African-American, 
Hispanics, and API is performed to ensure that diversity within the Navy is a reflection of 
American population demographics (Hojnowski, 2005). 
2.  Pry (1996) 
Pry’s research analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. Navy’s goal-based recruiting 
system. The research includes an evaluation of the goal setting policy at that time 
(1990s), and how the recruiter incentive system contributed towards goal 
accomplishment. Furthermore, included in the research is a recommendation for 
establishing a bonus incentive-based system that rewards recruiters equitably for 
production in an effort to achieve higher recruiter productivity.  
Pry discussed the structure of the NRC and NRDs that included goal planning and 
the types of recruiters assigned to each entity. A description of the types of awards and 
incentives authorized during the time of his study and prior years were discussed. The 
Gold Wreath award, a production award that an individual recruiter earns after achieving 
eight recruit contracts, was shown to be counterproductive in achieving the mission of the 
Navy in some cases. Pry hypothesized that as a result of no emphasis being placed on 
production in a single month for the Gold Wreath award eligibility criteria, a recruiter 
may be less inclined to work hard every month within that three-month time-period (Pry, 
1996). This behavior has negative impacts on goal accomplishment. That impact is 
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especially felt when the last month of that award eligibility window falls in September, 
which is the last month of the FY when end strength requirements need to be met.  
Pry stated that recruiters, by nature, sometimes exhibit risk-adverse behavior 
when the possibility of consistently overproducing may result in the assignment of 
increased future production goals (Pry, 1996). Pry utilizes a combination of interviews 
and discussions with key personnel including recruiters and staff assigned to CNRC to 
attain a better understanding of the goaling process. Pry seeks to analyze the hypothesis 
that overproduction does increase a district’s future production goal assignment. Three 
tests of the hypothesis were conducted using regression analysis on each NRD’s “goal-
per-recruiter” as the dependent variable for a specific year utilizing the NRD’s prior year 
goal accomplishment success rate as one of the explanatory variables. A similar 
regression was run with the exception that the prior two years goal accomplishment rate 
was utilized instead of only the prior year’s rate. To acquire a better understanding of the 
process, Pry then determined CNRC average yearly mission per recruiter to calculate the 
variance in the total CNRC mission across FY90–95. 
The first and second regression analyses of the hypothesis tests utilizing each 
districts “mission-per-recruiter” for a given year as the dependent variable utilizing the 
NRD’s prior year success rates and two prior years’ success rates, respectively, did not 
determine any statistically significant results to support the hypothesized relationship that 
increased recruiter productivity caused a future increase in assigned recruiter goals. The 
third regression’s dependent variable was extrapolated by subtracting the average 
CNRC’s mission (goal)-per-recruiter per year from the NRD’s mission (goal)-per-
recruiter per year. The explanatory variables, as previously stated, were the NRD’s prior 
years’ mission success rate. The hypothesis that overachievement by a district in a given 
year causes an increase in the assigned district’s mission for the following year was 
supported by the third regression analysis results for each district (Pry, 1996).  
During his research, Pry found that the goal-based system does promote skill 
variety, job identity, job significance, and feedback; however, it does not provide 
autonomy to the recruiter. As a result, recruiters are not given ownership of the process 
(Pry, 1996). As quoted by Pry in his research, Hackman and Oldman described job 
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identity as “when workers perceive the job as a whole and recognize all the steps in the 
process to produce an end product” (Pry, 1996). Hackman and Oldman also defined job 
significance as “when workers feel they are part of the process and their job has an 
impact on the end product” (Pry, 1996). Feedback was referred to as the closed-loop 
process when an employee’s performance is critiqued and the results of that feedback are 
tactfully and clearly provided to the employee (Pry, 1996). Pry did not have a formal 
method for measuring whether Navy recruiters have job identity and job significance. 
Nor did he have a formal method of measuring whether the recruiters (at the time of his 
study) received feedback. Nevertheless, Pry made assumptions that job identity and job 
significance did not exist for recruiters because “recruiters are not consulted with or 
encouraged to improve the goaling process” (Pry, 1996). Also, he noted that due to goals 
being dictated from higher levels of management, recruiters were only to achieve 
required production goals. Production recruiters do not provide input into the goaling 
process, and therefore, only perform to the set goaling mission. This process, Pry noted, 
does not leave room for recruiter expansion (growth) and surely does not promote 
increased mission accomplishment by the average recruiter (Pry, 1996).  
As shown in the historical data, NRD mission assignment increased from one year 
to the next for 77.4% of all NRDs that overproduced in previous years. The evaluation of 
the goaling system during the time of the study determined that the method of mission 
assignment was ineffective as stated by Pry (Pry, 1996). Sixteen percent of the districts 
displayed statistically significant results with a 95% confidence interval based on a 
sample of five observations per NRD in FY90–95. None of the NRDs in the sample 
experienced a reduction in mission assignment following overproduction in the prior 
year. Pry’s explanation of this effect of NRD overproduction is due to the pressures in the 
recruiting world to produce at every level of mission assignment that then leads to 
increased mission assignment. As a result, the NRDs that are historically overachievers 
are expected to produce at higher level in future years (Pry, 1996).  
The PRIME bonus incentive-based system was developed by the Naval 
Postgraduate School to provide an equitable recruiter reward program and better 
distribute recruiting resources (Pry, 1996). This system promotes recruiters’ ability to 
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provide input into the recruiting process by accurately forecasting their goals, which 
therefore contribute to improved future mission assignment. Also, PRIME disincentivizes 
recruiters to hold applicants for the following months and increases the recruiters’ market 
potential success rate (Pry, 1996). Recruiters are increasingly rewarded with higher 
productivity based on this system. Due to the dynamic nature of mission requirements, 
CNRC is able to adjust the PRIME model to change recruiter behavior or productivity 
focus with respect to a given type of applicant to meet the ever-changing needs of the 
Navy (Pry, 1996). 
3. CNA  
The last review of the enlisted goaling model was conducted in the late 1990s and 
did not incorporate all of the components affecting the recruiting market. CNA evaluated 
the enlisted and officer AC and RC goaling models and CNRC’s incentive systems 
created to promote recruiting goal (mission) accomplishment. Also, this research assesses 
the perception of some recruiters that too much emphasis is placed on past production 
when other recruiting market components have a much greater effect on future 
production. 
CNA stated that the goaling process should result in an equitable distribution of 
recruiting goals; thereby giving each recruiter an opportunity to succeed (Pinelis et al., 
2011). However, due to an incomplete use of available market data and possible resource 
allocation inefficiencies, the goaling models exhibit limitations that affect recruiter 
productivity (Pinelis et al., 2011). The U.S. military utilizes a goal-share process to 
distribute enlisted recruiter goals to the recruiters. Due to the inherent design of that 
process, CNA hypothesized that the U.S. Navy experienced decreases in recruiter 
productivity and mission accomplishment in the early 1990s (Pinelis et al., 2011). 
CNA sought to answer three questions. 
• What is the most effective goaling level or unit of analysis? 
• What market, demographic, and resource factors should be included in 
each model? 
• What method should be used to allocate recruiting goals? 
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The goaling models incorporate factors, such as historical production, recruiting 
resources, economic and population factors, seasonality, and pay, among other factors 
(CNA 2011). The goaling forecasting model also considers factors, such as population 
demographics, state unemployment rates, and available recruiting resources to produce 
goal shares disseminated to each region and allocated to each NRD based on historical 
recruiting success and recruiting resources. This research highlights the primary recruit 
market as high school seniors and HSDGs between the ages of 17 to 22. This group is 
theoretically in their optimal training age range. Men in the 22 to 29 age group, 
regardless of having a high school diploma, are considered secondary market material.  
The approach that CNA took began with Recruiter of the Year (ROY) interviews 
to determine what is missing from the current goaling process (Pinelis et al., 2011). The 
participants of the 2011 Officer Goaling Conference were also included in discussions. 
The review of Navy practices and modeling methods were conducted and compared to 
other services with respect to recruiting mission allocation. The data from other services 
were collected from the staff of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), and the Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS). 
After analyzing various databases in search of available factors that could enhance the 
current enlisted goaling models, CNA constructed an enlisted AC model. The databases 
utilized included the Enlisted Master File (EMF), Officer Master File (OMF), PRIDE, 
Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) and various market 
data resources (i.e., U.S. Census and National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)). 
Also, a recommendation was made for required data to enable the creation of similar 
goaling models for enlisted and officer RC and officer AC to improve the current goaling 
process (Pinelis et al., 2011).  
CNA used a Zero-inflated Poisson model, which is a count model using Poisson 
distribution, to determine zip-code level goaling distribution for 2006 through 2010 
recruiting years. Two stages were used during modeling due to the expected large number 
zero contracts for many of the zip codes (Pinelis et al., 2011). The first stage’s (any-
contracts model) purpose is to determine if the zip code will produce any contracts. The 
objective of the second stage (Counts model) is to determine how many contracts a zip 
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code will produce if determined to produce any contracts. The independent variables 
utilized in these models differed from those currently utilized in the Enlisted Goaling 
Model (Pinelis et al., 2011). Some of the variables included in the any-contracts model 
were distance to nearest college or university and their size, an interaction of the prior 
distance and size, and the existence of multiple colleges, as well as historically black 
colleges. The Counts model included variables, such as distance to the responsible NRS, 
demographic data, Navy Awareness Index, number of recruiters per zip code, crime data, 
and veteran population per county and age group. 
The any-contracts model’s results were consistent with the authors’ hypothesis 
that the closer the distance to a college or university, the greater the number of colleges 
or universities in the area, and the larger the size of the schools were predictive of a lower 
probability of producing any contracts in a zip code. Demographics exhibited significant 
positive correlation with enlistment, specifically for 17–19 year-old Hispanics in their 
first three years of high school. Also, Navy advertising input was found to have the 
largest positive correlation to enlistment (Pinelis et al., 2011).  
The predictive accuracy of the counts model was accomplished by calculating the 
average difference between the actual numbers of recruit contracts for each zip code (in 
2010) with the model’s prediction for that year by zip code. The absolute value of the 
average difference between predicted and actual contracts enabled the computation of the 
mean absolute deviation (MAD) that is 0.943. The model is only off by one recruit as 
represented by a MAD of one (0.943 rounded up to one) (Pinelis et al., 2011). 
CNA concluded that the current goaling model’s unit of analysis is the NRD that 
does not allow precise distribution of recruiting goals to maximize true market potential 
and needs. The enlisted AC model created and recommended by CNA forecasts the 
number of recruits goaled for each zip code that addresses the current goaling model’s 
lack of geographical specificity. The use of zip codes allows the model to incorporate 
demographic (gender and race/ethnicity) and geographic recruiting focuses and resource 
allocation (Pinelis et al., 2011).  
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C. SUMMARY 
Goal shares are generated utilizing a forecasting and econometric goaling model 
that considers historical factors (population demographics, local economic conditions, 
and recruiting resources) used as predictors of future recruiting success. Navy recruiters 
are assigned their contract goals based upon results of the Navy’s goaling forecasting 
model executed on an annual basis. Also, the U.S. Navy awards and incentives system 
provides the needed method geared towards increasing recruiter productivity in support 
of CNRC’s overall goaling mission, specifically for net new contract attainments for the 
high quality male population. These studies exhibit the crucial link between enlisted 
recruiter goaling and the quality of recruits actually obtained by these recruiters during 
past time periods.  
This thesis provides statistical recruit data and statistical analysis results that 
increases insight as to when Navy recruiters are not performing as expected when it 
comes to recruit quality, specifically for different times of the month. The results of this 
thesis can be used as a tool to assist CNRC in shaping recruiter behavior by providing 
feedback to recruiters and leadership alike. The results could also provide guidance for 
the adjustment to CNRC’s awards and incentives system. 
 31 
IV.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A.  DATA COLLECTION 
The data utilized in this study were collected from CNRC’s PRIDE database, 
which is updated on a real-time basis at CNRC. The period chosen for statistical analysis 
is the April 1997 through March 2011 timeframe, which captures recruit contract activity 
for all enlisted Navy recruiters. The original data files contained 768,508 observations of 
new recruits who signed contracts. Over the last few decades, CNRC has undergone 
restructuring from 31 to 26 NRDs. At the same time, some of the recruiting stations 
under each NRD’s cognizance have shifted and been renumbered. The NRD numbers 
utilized for this study consider the previously mentioned territorial shifts due to the 
restructuring of CNRC. Data on state unemployment rates were taken from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics government website for all U.S. states and territories 
(http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables.htm). 
B. SUMMARY OF SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
Recruits whose age at enlistment was less than 17 and greater than 35 were 
dropped so that the remaining observations reflected the average age for the majority of 
enlistees. The final data set used for the analysis contained 759, 087 observations. 
1. Dependent Variables 
Three types of binary dependent variables were created to represent low quality 
recruit contracts. Each of these alternative measures of low quality contracts were used in 
separate regression models. The three dependent variables captured low quality contracts 
based on three different definitions of quality: 1) contracts with a low AFQT score (less 
than 50%) or no traditional high school diploma, 2) contracts with only a low AFQT 
score, and 3) contracts without a traditional high school diploma.  
2. Independent (Explanatory) Variables 
The explanatory variables utilized in the multivariate regression models 
represented demographic factors, such as gender, race, marital status, and the age of 
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recruits at the time of enlistment. Enlistees were grouped into the following six race 
categories: Black, White, Asian, Native American, Hispanic, and Other. Dummy 
variables were created for states (excluding Wyoming), months (excluding January), and 
FY98–11. These dummy variables were included in the regressions to control for state, 
month, and year fixed effects. The average state-level unemployment rate for the 12 
months leading up to the recruit’s enlistment date also was included in the multivariate 
regression models. The primary explanatory variables measured the time of month that 
the contract was written. The variables created indicated whether the contract was written 
near the end of the month and included binary variables representing contracts written in 
the last seven days, the last five days, the last three days, and the last day of the month. 
These time-indicator variables were included separately in each of the four low quality 
models to determine the effect of signing contracts near the end of the month on the 
quality of the contract. Variables were also created to indicate if the recruit contract was 
written within the recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award eligibility period. Furthermore, 
another variable was created to indicate if the time of the contract fell within the last 
month of the recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award eligibility period. Table 4.1 provides the 












Table 4.1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
  
 Age  Continuous variable, 17–35 years 
 Female =1 if female; =0 otherwise 
 Married =1 if married; =0 otherwise 
 White =1 if White; =0 otherwise 
 Black  =1 if Black; =0 otherwise 
 Asian  =1 if Asian; =0 otherwise 
 Native American =1if Native American; =0 otherwise 
 Hispanic  =1 if Hispanic; =0 otherwise 
 Other Race  =1 if not included in above ethnicities; =0 otherwise 
 _Istate_1- _Istate_56  =1 if enlistment state; =0 otherwise 
 Month 1–12  =1 if enlistment month (Jan.–Dec.); =0 otherwise 
 FY97–FY11 =1 if Fiscal Year 1997–2011, respectively; =0 otherwise 
 Unemployment rate 12 Continuous variable; average state unemployment rate  
 12 months prior to recruit contract date 
   
 Low AFQT score or no  =1 if AFQT score<50 or NHSDG; =0 otherwise 
 High School Diploma  
 Low AFQT score =1 if AFQT score<50; =0 otherwise  
 No High School  =1 if NHSDG; =0 otherwise 
 Diploma   
 Last 7  =1 if contract written in the last 7 days of month; =0 otherwise 
 Last 5  =1 if contract written in the last 5 days of month; =0 otherwise 
 Last 3  =1 if contract written in the last 3 days of month; =0 otherwise 
 Last day  =1 if contract written the last day of month; =0 otherwise 
 gold  =1 if within 1st Gold Wreath eligibility time-period; =0 otherwise 
 gold3  =1 if last month of 1st Gold Wreath eligibility time-period; 
 =0 otherwise 
 All variables created by Author utilizing PRIDE database 










C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for the analysis variables. 
Table 4.2. Variables Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
Age  20 3.082 
Female 0.203 0.403 
Male 0.796 0.403 
Married 0.023 0.150 
White 0.410 0.492 
Black  0.094 0.292 
Asian  0.021 0.142 
Native American 0.028 0.164 
Hispanic  0.195 0.396 
Other Race 0.448 0.497 
Average Unemployment Rate 12 
months prior to contract date  5.469 1.783 
Low AFQT score or no High 
School Diploma 0.320 0.466 
Low AFQT score 0.299 0.458 
No High School Diploma 0.021 0.144 
Last 7 days  0.310 0.462 
Last 5 days  0.271 0.444 
Last 3 days  0.182 0.386 
Last day  0.097 0.296 
Contract falling within 1st Gold 
Wreath eligibility period  0.083 0.277 
Contract falling within last month 
of 1st Gold Wreath eligibility 
period 0.035 0.183 
Created by Author 
 
1. Low Quality Recruit Indicators 
Recruits who had a low AFQT score or no traditional high school diploma 
represented 32% of the sample while recruits with low AFQT scores only and recruits 
with no high school diploma represented approximately 30% and 2.1% of the sample, 
respectively. The mean value for the low quality recruit who either has a low AFQT test 
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score only or no traditional high school diploma inclusively represents the mean values of 
the remaining two low quality types in this sample. Based on prior studies, recruits who 
score 50 or greater on the AFQT but do not possess a traditional high school diploma 
have an increased risk of attrition during their first term of service (Bruno, 2005). While 
recruit quality is a predictor of attrition rates, it seems likely that a recruit who is lower 
quality would cause a recruiter to think twice before rushing to sign a contract, 
particularly just to earn an award.  
2. Age 
The average age of recruits in the sample was 20 years old. Of those recruits, 68% 
were between the ages of 17 to 19 and 32% were between the ages of 20 and 35. Due to 
most recruits enlisting after high school graduation, the sample age group percentages 
reflects historical demographic data.  
3. Gender 
Males comprised 79.6% of the sample while females represented 20.4% of the 
sample. Males have been historically represented more than females in the U.S. Navy, 
which accounts for the comparatively high number of male recruits. 
4.  Marital Status 
Non-married recruits composed 97.8% of the sample while married recruits 
accounted for only 2.2% of the sample. However, seemingly a good predictor of recruit 
quality, marital status continues to affect recruit quality.  
5.  Race 
Whites accounted for approximately 40% of the sample whereas Blacks, Asians, 
Native Americans, Hispanics, and Others accounted for 9.4%, 2.1%, 2.7%, 20%, and 
45%, respectively. The total race percentage exceeds 100% due to some recruits 
associating themselves with more than one race.  
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6.  State Unemployment Rate 
A state’s unemployment rate has been hypothesized to be a factor in an 
individual’s decision to enlist in the U.S. Navy and other military services. The state’s 
unemployment rate average for the 12 months leading up to the recruit’s contract date is 
5.5% for this sample. 
7. End-of-Month Day Indicators 
Contracts falling within the last seven days of a given month comprised 31% of 
the sample recruit contracts signed within the last five days, last three days, and the last 
day of the month composed approximately 27%, 18.2%, and 9.7%, respectively, of the 
sample. The decreasing number of recruit contracts signed as the last day of the month 
approaches reflects the push by recruiters to meet contract goals before the last day of 
any given month.  
8. Recruit Contract Date Within 1st Gold Wreath Award Eligibility 
Period 
Contracts that fell within the recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award eligibility period 
comprised 8.3% of the sample. Of those contracts that fell within the Gold Wreath award 
period, and that also fell within the last month of the recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award 
eligibility period, comprised 3.5% of the overall sample.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models were specified to estimate the 
effect of end-of-the month indicators on recruit quality, controlling for FY, state, and 
month fixed effects. Regression models were created for each end-of-month indicator—
the last seven days, last five days, last three days, and last day, respectively. Separate 
OLS regression models were estimated to determine the effect on recruit quality by using 
indicator variables representing if a recruit contract date fell within the individual 
recruiters first Gold Wreath award eligibility period and, if so, if the contract date fell 
within the last month of the recruiter’s 1st Gold Wreath award eligibility period. The 
Gold Wreath award eligibility period is utilized in the regression models due to the 
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consistent authorization of the Gold Wreath award in the CNRC awards system over the 
previous decades.  
State and fiscal year dummy variables, average state-level unemployment rates 
for the 12 months leading up to the enlistment, and demographic factors including age, 
race (Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic and Other Race), and female are used in 
each OLS regression model. 
The regression results provide estimates of the marginal effect on recruit quality 
for each of the variables utilized in the regression. The estimated coefficients, if 
statistically significant, represent the effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variable on the percentage point change in the probability that the contract will be low 
quality.  
Fixed effects regression models that control for recruiters’ ability over time would 
have been the preferred statistical analysis method. However, due to maximum capacity 
limitations of the statistical analysis database and rather large number of recruiters (over 
20,000), recruiter fixed effects were not estimated. 
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V.  MODEL ESTIMATION 
A. MODELS 
In an effort to determine if recruits who enlisted at the end of the month were 
lower quality than recruits who enlisted earlier in the month, the low quality binary 
variables representing low quality enlistees (those recruits who have either a low AFQT 
score (less than 50) or no traditional high school diploma, those who have a low AFQT 
score, and those recruits not having a traditional high school diploma, respectively) were 
each regressed on various factors statistically found in prior studies to predict recruit 
quality. Descriptions of Low Quality multivariate models are listed in Table 5.1. Eighteen 
versions of the multivariate OLS regression models based on each of the three outcomes 
are specified to estimate the effect of the explanatory variables on each of the recruit 
quality types. OLS models 1–4 estimate the probability of a contract being low quality 
based on the recruit having either a low AFQT score or no high school diploma. OLS 
models 1–4 have the same specification with the exception that the end-of-the-month day 
indicators change from the last five days, the last three days, and the last day of the 
month. OLS models 5–8 estimate the probability of a contract being low quality based on 
having a low AFQT score only. OLS models 5–8 have the same specification for each of 
the separate end-of-the-month indicators. 
OLS models 9–12 estimate the probability of a contract being low quality based 
on the recruit having no high school diploma. OLS models 9–12 have the same 
specification with the exception of the use of the different end-of-the- month indicators. 
OLS models 13–14 also estimate the probability of a contract being low quality based on 
the recruit having either a low AFQT score or no high school diploma. These models 
have the same specification as models 1–4 with the exception of an indicator variable 
representing whether the recruit’s enlistment date falls within the recruiter’s first Gold 
Wreath award eligibility period and, if so, an indicator representing if a recruit contract 
date fell within the last month of the 1st Gold Wreath eligibility period, respectively. No 
end-of-the-month day indicators are used in these models. OLS models 15–16 estimate 
the probability of a contract being low quality based solely on a low AFQT score. These 
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model specifications are the same as models 13–14. Finally, models 17–18 estimate the 
probability of a contract being low quality based on the recruit having no high school 
diploma only. These models also utilize the same specifications as models 15–16. All of 
the models are estimated as linear probability models (LPM). To control for various fixed 
effects, the LPM models also include state, month, and fiscal year dummy variables. Low 
quality contract production may vary systematically by state or by month of the year or 
by year. Fixed effects models control for these systematic, but unobserved variations.  
Table 5.1 Description of Low Quality Models 
 Quality Indicator Model Number End-of-the-Month Indicator 
Low AFQT score or  
no High School 
Diploma 
1 Last 7 days 
2 Last 5 days 
3 Last 3 days 
4  Last day 
Low AFQT score 
5 Last 7 days 
6 Last 5 days 
7 Last 3 days 
8  Last day 
No High School 
Diploma 
9 Last 7 days 
10 Last 5 days 
11 Last 3 days 
12  Last day 
    Gold Wreath Award Eligibility time-period 
Low AFQT score or  
no High School 
Diploma 
13  Recruit contract falling  
  within 1st Gold Wreath  
  eligibility period  
   
14  Recruit contract falling  
  within last month of 1st  
  Gold Wreath eligibility  
   period 
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 Quality Indicator Model Number End-of-the-Month Indicator 
Low AFQT  
score 
15  Recruit contract falling  
  within 1st Gold Wreath  
  eligibility period  
   
16  Recruit contract falling  
  within last month of 1st  
  Gold Wreath eligibility  
   period 
No High School 
Diploma 
17  Recruit contract falling  
  within 1st Gold Wreath  
  eligibility period 
   
18  Recruit contract falling  
  within last month of 1st  
  Gold Wreath eligibility  
   period 
 
B.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The OLS Model is the following: 
Yistm = Xistmβ + URstmγ + ∑ δsSs + ∑ αtΤt + ∑ λmMm + ɛistm 
 s t m 
where: 
–Yistm is one of the three low quality indicator types for recruit i from state s with 
enlistment year t and enlistment month m 
 
–Xistm represents the set of demographic factors, end-of-the-month indicators, and 
indicator variables representing whether the contract date fell within the recruiter’s 1st 
Gold Wreath award eligibility period and, if so, an indicator variable representing if a 
contract date fell within the last month of that three-month time-period (see Chapter IV). 
 
–URstm represents average unemployment rate 12 months prior to the enlistment date 
 
–Ss represents indicator variables for state 
 
–Τt represents indicator variables for year 
 
–Mm represents indicator variables for month 
 
– ɛistm is the error term 
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As in fixed effects models, controlling for state, year and month enabled the 
estimates to represent the effects of within-state changes in end-of-the-month indicators 
on the within-state changes on the quality of the recruits enlisting (Arkes & Mehay, 
2013). The same outcome holds true for the effects of recruit contracts being written 
during a recruiter’s 1st Gold Wreath award eligibility period and also contracts falling 
within the last month of that 1st Gold Wreath award eligibility period (Arkes & Mehay, 
2013). 
C.  HYPOTHESIS, REFERENCE GROUP, AND EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES RELATIONSHIP/INTERPRETATION 
1. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is the following. 
• H0: Recruits enlisting towards the end of the month are of the same quality 
as those enlisting at the beginning of the month. 
• H1: Recruiters sacrifice recruit quality at the end of the month to earn the 
awards, which result in a statistically different effect on recruit quality. 
Also, if so, recruit quality is even less during the last month of the 1st 
Gold Wreath award eligibility time period. 
2. Hypothesized Relationship of Effect of Explanatory Variables  
a.  Age 
The average age of a recruit in this sample is 20 years old. Based on the 
prior literature, the hypothesized relationship between age and recruit quality is that 
recruits who are older at the time of enlistment will tend to have a higher likelihood of 
being higher quality. 
b. Gender 
Males have historically scored higher on the AFQT tests, so it is expected 
that they would comprise the least amount of low quality recruits compared to female 
recruits. Females; however, historically have a higher graduation rate compared to males.  
 43 
c. Marital Status 
A recruit who is married may be more motivated to score well on the 
AFQT test, which consequently places them in the high quality category, assuming they 
have attained a traditional high school diploma. Thus, recruits who are married are 
expected to have higher probabilities of being high quality recruits. 
d. Race 
White recruits have historically scored higher on the AFQT test, with 
Asians following close behind. Black and Hispanic individuals lag behind on AFQT test 
scores even though their scores on average have increased through the years. Black and 
Hispanic recruits are expected to have a higher probability of being low quality recruits. 
e. Year 
The author hypothesizes that socio-economic and political issues and 
events over time affect the quality and quantity of the military-eligible youth population. 
Fluctuations in the youth population are reflected in the quality of new recruit contracts.  
f. Unemployment Rate 
The average of the unemployment rate for the 12 months leading up to an 
individual’s enlistment are hypothesized to have inversely proportional effects on the 
number of individuals enlisting, which leads to an increased or decreased taste towards 
military service. This trend accounts for the overall increase or decrease in recruit quality. 
Also, during times of low state-level unemployment rates, the recruiting force faces 
increased challenges to attract the high quality recruits from the military-eligible youth 
population. 
g. End-of-Month Day Indicator 
As hypothesized in section C 1. b., recruiters may rush to make goal at the 
end of the month and may sacrifice recruit quality to meet their goal.  
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h. Recruit Contract Date in 1st Gold Wreath Award Eligibility Time 
Period 
As previously mentioned, the sacrifice of recruit quality by recruiters may 
be more apparent during the 1st Gold Wreath award eligibility time period and even 
greater during that last month of that time period. Recruiters’ eligibility for the 1st Gold 
Wreath award begins after an individual recruiter has been attached to a NRS for at least 
90 days. Recruiters are trying to make a name for themselves at the NRDs by earning 
awards, and therefore, may be more willing to take lesser quality recruits to make 
monthly contract goals. 
3.  Results 
Table 5.2 below displays the regression results for each low quality type outcome 
using the last seven days end-of-month indicator variable. State dummy variables were 
















Table 5.2 OLS Regression Models of Probability of Recruit Being Low Quality 
  (Last 7) (Last 7) (Last 7) 
 
Low AFQT score or  
no High School 
Diploma 
Low AFQT  
score 















Last 7 days 0.044*** (0.001) 0.035*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 
Age -0.010*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000)  0.000** (0.000) 
Female -0.009*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.000) 
Married 0.015*** (0.004) 0.010*** (0.004) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Asian 0.048*** (0.004) 0.062*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.001) 
Native American -0.071*** (0.003) -0.081*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.001) 
Black 0.238*** (0.002) 0.255*** (0.002) -0.016*** (0.001) 
Hispanic 0.053*** (0.001) 0.053*** (0.001)  0.000 (0.000) 
Other Race -0.147*** (0.002) -0.148*** (0.002) 0.001** (0.001) 
February 0.008*** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.002** (0.001) 
March  -0.004 (0.002)  -0.002 (0.002) -0.005*** (0.001) 
April -0.015*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.001) 
May -0.005** (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003) -0.007*** (0.001) 
June -0.010*** (0.002)  -0.002 (0.002) -0.011*** (0.001) 
July  0.001 (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.001) 
August  0.001 (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) 
September 0.006** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) 
October  -0.002 (0.003)  0.001 (0.002) -0.006*** (0.001) 
November -0.008*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001) 
December  0.004 (0.003)  0.000 (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 1998 0.052*** (0.004) 0.052*** (0.004) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 1999 0.064*** (0.004) 0.040*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2000 0.065*** (0.004) 0.041*** (0.004) 0.023*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2001 0.064*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2002 0.059*** (0.004) 0.052*** (0.004) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2003 0.137*** (0.004) 0.130*** (0.004) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2004 0.163*** (0.004) 0.170*** (0.004) -0.008*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2005 0.134*** (0.004) 0.140*** (0.004) -0.006*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2006 0.123*** (0.004) 0.133*** (0.004) -0.011*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2007 0.134*** (0.004) 0.135*** (0.004)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2008 0.123*** (0.004) 0.135*** (0.004) -0.012*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2009 0.092*** (0.004) 0.104*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.001) 
Fiscal Year 2010 0.034*** (0.005) 0.042*** (0.005) -0.009*** (0.002) 
Fiscal Year 2011 0.021*** (0.006) 0.032*** (0.006) -0.013*** (0.002) 
Average Unemployment 
rate for 12 months prior -0.012*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) 
Constant 0.497*** (0.012) 0.471*** (0.012) 0.026*** (0.004) 
       
Observations 741,677  741,677  741,677  
R-squared 0.074   0.072   0.015   
Standard errors in parentheses *Note State fixed effects were also included   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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The results in columns 1–2 show that recruits whose contract date occurred during 
the last seven days of any given month (as compared to recruits who sign during the first 
23 days of the month) had a 4.4-percentage-points higher probability of being low quality 
(based on having either a low AFQT score or no high school diploma). This result was 
strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level.  
The results in columns 3–4 indicate that a recruit whose contract date occurred 
during the last seven days of any given month had a 3.5-percentage-point higher 
probability of being low quality based on having a low AFQT score only. This result was 
also strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level.  
The results in columns 5–6 indicate that recruits whose contract was written 
during the last seven days of the month had a 0.9-percentage-points higher probability of 
being low quality based on not having a high school diploma. These recruits were less 
likely to be low quality during the last seven days of the month as compared to the 
recruits who were of low quality based on having a low AFQT score that enlisted during 
the same time-period. That estimate is also strongly statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Table 5.2 also shows that a recruit who is between the ages of 17 and 21 has a 1-
percentage-point lower probability of being low quality (based on having either a low 
AFQT score or no high school diploma). The same results hold true for recruits of the 
17–21 age groups to be low quality based on having only a low AFQT score. The results 
for the first two quality measures are strongly statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. The result of the third quality measure is moderately statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. 
Females recruited during the last seven days of the month exhibit a 0.09-
percentage-point lower probability of being low quality (based on having a low AFQT 
score or no high school diploma) as compared to males. The results were strongly 
significant at the 1% significance level. Female recruits exhibited a 0.06-percentage point 
lower probability of being low quality (based on a low AFQT score only) compared to 
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males. Most notable was the 1.6-percentage point lower probability for a female to be 
low quality (based on not having a high school diploma). 
Married recruits who enlisted during the last seven days of the month have a 1.5 
and 1 percentage-point higher probability of being low quality (based on having either a 
low AFQT score or no high school diploma and also (based on for having only a low 
AFQT score). Also, these married recruits face a 0.04-percentage-point higher probability 
of being low quality (based on not having a high school diploma). These results were 
strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
Asian recruits exhibited a 4.8 and 6.2-percentage-point lower probability of being 
low quality based on the first two measures of low quality. However, based on the third 
measure of low quality, Asians whose contract date fell within the last seven days of the 
month experience a 1.4-percentage-point lower probability of being low quality. These 
results were strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
Native Americans recruits exhibit a 7.1 and 8.1-percentage-point lower 
probability of being low quality when enlisting during the last seven days of the month 
based on the first two measures of low quality. However, based on the third indicator of 
low quality, Native American recruits enlisting during the last seven days of the month 
have a 1-percentage-point higher probability of being low quality. These results were 
strongly significant at the 1% significance level. 
Black recruits exhibited a 23.8 and 25.5-percentage-point higher probability of 
being low quality if recruited during the last seven days of the month based on the first 
two measures of low quality. However, Black recruits whose contract date fell within the 
last seven days of the month had only a 1.6-percentage-point lower probability of being 
low quality (due to not having a high school diploma) as compared to white male recruits. 
These results were also strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
Hispanic recruits exhibited a 5.3-percentage-point higher probability of being low 
quality if recruited during the last seven days of the month using the first two measures of 
low quality. However, based on the third indicator of low quality, Hispanic recruits 
whose contract dates fell within the last seven days of the month did not have a higher 
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probability of being low quality. These results were strongly statistically significant at the 
1% significance level.  
Recruits of other races exhibited a 1.5-percentage-point lower probability of being 
low quality based on the first two measures of low quality. However, recruits of other 
races had only a 0.01-percentage-point higher probability of being low quality based on 
not having a high school diploma. The results for the first two measures were strongly 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. However, the result for the third 
quality measure was significant only at the 5% significance level. 
The results for the month indicators showed that recruits who enlisted during the 
months of April, June, and July had about a 1-percentage-point lower probability of being 
low quality as compared to recruits enlisting in January. These results were strongly 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Of those three months mentioned, 
April exhibited the lowest probability of being low quality for all three low quality 
indicators. 
Fiscal Years 1998 thru 2002 had higher probabilities of low quality recruits 
enlisting compared to 1997, whereas 2003 thru 2011 exhibited a lower probability of low 
quality recruits enlisting on average. These results were also strongly statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level. 
The state-level unemployment rate 12 months prior to enlistment decreased the 
probability of a recruit being low quality. This result supports prior analysis of the 
inverse effect of state unemployment rates on successful military recruiting. The estimate 
showed that a 1-point increase in the average unemployment rate 12 months prior to a 
recruit’s enlistment reduces the probability of being low quality (using the first measure 
of quality) by 1-percentage-point. The same results held true for recruits to be low quality 
based solely on a low AFQT score. A 1-point increase in the average state unemployment 
rate only caused a 0.02-percentage-point decrease in the probability of a recruit being low 
quality based on not having a high school diploma. Historically, the number of recruits 
enlisting increases when state unemployment rates rise causing an overall greater influx 
of both low and high quality recruits. 
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Table 5.3 OLS Regression Models of Probability of Recruits Being Low Quality 
  
Low AFQT score 
or no High School 
Diploma   
Low 
AFQT  
score   
No High 
School  














       
Last 7 days 0.044*** (0.001) 0.035*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 
       
Last 5 days 0.049*** (0.001) 0.040*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.000) 
       
Last 3 days 0.051*** (0.001) 0.040*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.000) 
       
Last day 0.057*** (0.002) 0.045*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.001) 
 (Standard errors in parentheses) Created by Author 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.3 displays the regression results for all four of the end-of-month 
indicators. To save space only the coefficients of the end-of-month variables are 
displayed in Table 5.3. The results exhibit the same higher probability of a recruiter 
enlisting a low quality recruit as the end-of-the-month approaches, regardless of which 
specific end-of-month indicator is used in the model. The probability that a recruit is low 
quality increases by 4.9, 5.1, and 5.7 percentage-points if recruited during the last five 
days, last three days, and last day of the month, respectively. The estimated results for 
these end-of-the-month indicators are all strongly statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Also, recruits whose contract date occurred during the last seven days of any 
given month exhibited the same trend of having a higher probability of being low quality 
based on a low AFQT score. The percentage-point increases are 3.5, 4.0, 4.0, and 4.5 for 
last seven days, last five days, last three days, and last day, respectively. These results 
were all strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level.  
Based on not having a high school diploma, recruits whose contract dates fell 
within the last seven days, last five days, last three days, and on the last day are estimated 
to have 0.09, 1.0, 1.1, and a 1.2-percentage-point higher probability of being low quality. 
These results were strongly statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
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Table 5.4 OLS Models Results for Indicators Representing the Effect on Low 
Quality Types for Recruit Contract Dates Falling Within the Recruiter’s 1st Gold 
Wreath Award Eligibility Time Period 
  
Low AFQT 
score or no 
High 
School 
Diploma   
Low 
AFQT  
score   
No High 
School  














Recruit contract falling      
within 1st Gold Wreath       
eligibility time-period  -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
       
Recruit contract falling        
within last month of 1st        
Gold Wreath eligibility        
time-period 0.001  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
              
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.4 exhibits the regression results for the indicator variables representing if 
a recruit contract was written during a recruiter’s first Gold Wreath award eligibility 
period. One model includes an indicator representing if the enlistment date fell within 
that three-month award eligibility period. The next model includes an indicator 
representing if the enlistment date fell within the last month of that three-month award 
eligibility period. The results for a recruit whose contract date fell within the recruiter’s 
first Gold Wreath award eligibility period were not statistically significant for any of the 
three measures of low quality contracts The results for the indicator variable representing 
those recruits whose contract dates fell within the last month of the recruiter’s first Gold 
Wreath award eligibility period also were not statistically significant at predicting 
whether a recruit would be of low quality. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY  
U.S. Navy recruiters face many challenges that affect their ability to recruit high 
quality recruits and may at times sacrifice recruit quality at the end of any given month to 
earn awards. The regression results in this thesis supported the hypothesis that as the end 
of the month approaches, recruits have a higher probability of being low quality. The last 
day of any given month showed the highest likelihood of a recruit being low quality as 
compared to the earlier days in the month.  
The gold and gold3 indicator variables effects were not statistically significant 
which does not validate the hypothesis that recruits enlisting during a recruiter’s first 
Gold Wreath eligibility time-period have a higher probability of being low quality as 
compared to those same recruits enlisting after that time-period.  
The three low quality type regression estimate results for Black recruits exhibited 
the largest effect on recruit quality. Black recruits exhibited a 23.8 and 25.5 percentage-
point higher probability of being low quality based on the main two indicators of being 
low quality (having either a low AFQT score or no high school diploma and also for only 
having a low AFQT score) as compared to white male recruits. 
The U.S. Navy’s goal is to recruit 75% high quality individuals at a minimum but 
that percentage was decreased during tough recruiting years when state unemployment 
rates were low. As Commander Navy Recruiting Command stated in the Navy Recruiting 
Command’s “Recruiting Force 2020 Strategy” (Commander Navy Recruiting Command, 
2012b), the mission of Navy Recruiting is to—“Recruit the best men and women for 
America’s Navy to accomplish today’s missions and meet tomorrow’s challenges.” The 
Navy has seen and continues to see successful recruiting years since the Great Recession; 
however, if the best recruits are what the Navy desires, the policies and programs that 
support the recruiting force must place an increased emphasis on recruiters attracting 




The U.S. Navy Awards and Incentives System may be counter-productive in 
incentivizing recruiters to meet their Net Contract Objective goals. The average Navy 
recruiter is forced to make hard decisions when it comes to focusing their efforts on 
prospective recruits. Due to the challenging and dynamic nature of Navy recruiting, high 
quality recruits require more resources to attract. If recruiters have not made their recruit 
contract goals by the last week of the month, statistical analysis in this thesis shows that 
recruiters are highly likely to recruit a low quality individual because they are easier to 
recruit and are probably waiting on the recruiter’s call to service. Although the current 
Navy Awards and Incentive System places an increased emphasis on the requirement to 
attract higher quality recruits, changes must be continually made to address the needs of 
the recruiting force  
Enlisting low quality recruits do not come without a price. As the U.S. Navy 
becomes more fiscally prudent, the training dollars, administrative man-hours, and 
available recruiter time is becoming more stringent. The downsizing of the Navy 
manpower imposes a greater need to attract the higher quality military-eligible youth to 
meet the future needs of this diverse organization. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Changes to the USN Recruiter Awards and Incentives System 
The results in this thesis suggest that a special bonus-point category within the 
Enlisted Recruiter Incentive System (ERIS) program that is only authorized to be earned 
during the last week of the month should be initiated. Recruiters would earn the bonus 
points for writing recruit contracts for recruits who have the lowest probability of being 
low quality during the last week of any given month. Also, to earn these points, recruiters 
must recruit a minimum number of high quality individuals during the month as 
determined by CNRC. These bonus points may then be applied to the individual 
recruiter’s recruit contract record for competition in RCAP. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter II, RCAP provides selected candidates with immediate promotion. Recruiters 
earning immediate advancement also earn a reputation for being the best at their jobs. 
 53 
This new special bonus-point program within the ERIS program should be implemented 
and simultaneously adopted with a change to the RCAP instruction’s eligibility criteria. 
Nevertheless, most sailors, specifically recruiters, seek to achieve immediate promotion 
to the next pay grade through superior job performance. Further analysis into the proper 
promulgation of such a program is needed for a more informed decision for program 
creation and implementation. 
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APPENDIX. 
Table A.1 exhibits the RIS point-based program available to recruiters based upon 
the quarterly AAA Instruction Notice distributed by CNRC. The point valuation is based 
upon updated recruit demographics and skills to reflect the desired recruit contract and 
accession goals to include dynamic manpower mission requirements of the U.S. Navy.  
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